Abstract: Ten states, primarily from Central and Eastern Europe, will be admitted to the EU in 2004. The present paper assesses the competitiveness implications of this enlargement for Portugal. Four specific topics are considered: the trade and industry effects, the implications for Portugal's ability to attract FDI, the likely levels and consequences of immigration from Central and Eastern Europe and the implications for Portugal's budgetary relations with the rest of the EU. 
Introduction
After Cypriot economies, previous analyses on the subject have concentrated on the implications of the accession of the CEEC only. This is also the position we adopt.
With Eastern enlargement, a region of about 100 million inhabitants emerging from almost half a century of Soviet domination will be integrated into the EU. A process of economic integration as profound and extensive as this will have far-reaching implications for the current EU member states. As in any similar liberalisation process, the lifting of trade barriers already accomplished under the Europe Agreements allows for productive factors to be reallocated to more efficient activities, reflected in the productive specialisation of the CEE countries and, by extension, in the volume and pattern of their trade. 1 International direct investment flows -in terms of volume and geographical and sectoral distribution -will be further affected by accession, as will overall industrial location. But the particular past of the CEE candidates poses entirely new issues for the EU. First of all, the applicants are in a process of transition to the market economy and much of the analysis of the impact of enlargement depends upon assessments of the extent to which the process has been completed. Secondly, the purpose is to integrate into the "rich man's club" countries starting from very low levels of income per head (39 % of the average in the EU15). The accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain in the 1980s also brought relatively low-income partners into the Union, 1 A total of ten association agreements were signed with the EU between 1991 and 1996, leading to a liberalisation of market access for industrial goods over a period of (a maximum) 10 years for Eastern countries and five years for the EU. The former had already opted for relatively low tariffs and quotas after shaking off communism however (Pelkmans, 2001, section 18.4) . These agreements also include explicit references to the eventual accomplishment of the free movement of services, capital and, conditionally, of persons.
though per-capita PPP-based income levels in those countries were already at about 62 percent of the levels pertaining to EU incumbents at that time.
The low level of economic development of the Eastern candidate countries and the relatively large size of their agricultural sectors lie at the heart of most of the "high profile" enlargement issues, such as the planned extension of the structural funds and
Common Agricultural Policy programmes, east-west migration and labour-market effects. Thus, the pressure has been to establish transition periods before new members achieve full access to regional and agricultural programmes. For example, the capping of structural fund transfers to new members at the 4 % of their GDP, as decided by the Berlin Council, is likely to be extended beyond 2006. Recent studies suggest that enlargement should not put an unbearable strain on the EU budget, though the distribution across member states is important. Accession of the CEEC is also expected to lead to significant EU migration inflows, with the possibility of wage reductions and job losses for unskilled incumbents.
Many studies have demonstrated that all of these issues are manageable and should not cause substantial economic problems to the Union as a whole. Besides, the benefits in terms of further trade integration and migration are substantial and will largely outweigh the costs of accession at the EU aggregate level (Baldwin et al.,1997; Lejour et al., 2001; Breuss, 2001) . However difficulties may arise in the case of particular members, particularly Portugal, as suggested, for instance, by Baldwin et al.(1997) .
The present paper is a broad reflection on the economic impact of Eastern enlargement on the Portuguese economy. Section 2 deals with external trade; Section 3 with inward FDI; Section 4 with migration flows and Section 5 with the Structural and Cohesion Fund programmes. Section 6 concludes.
Trade Effects of Enlargement
After Portuguese accession to the EU an important change in the country's export structure occurred. As shown in Table 1 , the share of the labour intensive traditional sectors (textiles, clothing, footwear) decreased, while the share of machinery, apparatus, vehicle and other transport equipment -the sectors with the highest FDI inflows in terms of foreign equity in Portuguese manufacturing -increased. In 2000, the weight of this last group clearly overcame the traditional one (by 10 percentage points), a notable feature considering the predominance of the latter in the past. However, at the end of the 1990s the weight of the traditional sector in total exports was still much higher for
Portugal than was the case for the EU average (respectively 30% and 6 % in the second half of the 1990s). The Portuguese economy is highly open (with exports and imports summing to 75 percent of GDP), with most of the export and import flows taking place with the EU15 (80.3 and 75.1 % of total exports and imports, respectively, in 2000). This exceeds the EU15 average by almost 20 percentage points (again evaluated over the second half of the 1990s).
With the elimination of trade barriers between incumbents and accession states, two effects on the Portuguese economy may be predicted: a trade creation effect in terms of an increase in bilateral flows with the CEEC, and a shift effect, as CEE countries displace some Portuguese exports to EU markets. 2 We do not focus on intra-industry and quality aspects of EU-CEE trade, but Caetano et al. (2002) predicts a deepening of intra-industry trade, mainly of the vertical type.
The extent of pre-accession integration of Eastern applicants is already substantial as the Europe Agreements have led to the removal of tariffs on industrial products (though impediments to trade in agriculture and food processing remain). Thus many of the static trade effects of enlargement are already noticeable.
As shown in Table 2 , the weight of CEE countries in Portuguese external trade has increased from the very modest levels achieved in 1995. However, in 2000, the CEEC accounted for no more than 1.22 % of Portuguese exports and 1.29 % of imports.
Among the CEE countries, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are Portugal's main trading partners (accounting for 82.8% of total exports to the CEEC and 72.9% of total imports from the CEEC). This fact suggests that we focus particular attention on these three countries. Although Portuguese trade with the CEEC increased at a much higher rate than with other partners, the importance of these countries for Portuguese external trade remains small. It is noteworthy that imports from CEEC have increased at a higher speed than exports towards these markets, unlike in the Irish case for example. Other EU countries also registered a significant increase in trade with the CEEC -particularly Germany, Austria, France and Italy. 3 The same three CEE countries account for the bulk of trade with the rest of the EU also.
Let us now evaluate the second effect. Is it reasonable to consider a significant diversion of EU imports away from Portugal and towards the CEE countries? It seems to us that the answer is a qualified yes. The reasons are twofold: the high degree of similarity between the Portuguese export structure and that of the CEEC, and the fact that for the majority of Portuguese export sectors, CEEC became progressively more competitive during the second half of the 1990's, as shown by an analysis of EU market share data.
Similarities in export structures are evaluated using the Finger-Kreinin export overlapping index. 4 Table 3 shows the index for exports to the EU market of countries "a" and "b", where "a" is a EU member and "b" a CEE country (including Bulgaria and Romania). An index value of 1 would indicate that the relative weight of the products considered in total exports is the same for both economies, while a value of zero would indicate a complete difference. Portugal has, together with France, Germany, Italy, Austria and Spain the highest value. Being so, these countries can potentially be significantly affected by this shift effect. Furthermore, it is worthwhile noting that, among these countries, Portugal is the one that stands to benefit least from the first effect analysed above.
To compare the competitiveness of Portuguese and CEEC exports in the EU15 market we consider two years: 1995 and 2000. The latter year is the most recent for 3 These countries are the main trade partners of CEEC with Germany at the top, responsible in 1999, for about 25 % of imports from CEEC and receiving about 33% of their exports (Martín et al. , 2002) . 4 The Finger-Kreinin index is given by: ∑ min (S i ac ,S i bc ) where S i ac is the weight of product i in country a exports to country c and S i bc is the weight of product i in country b exports to country c. In this study, "country" c is the EU. More important than the relative weight of the different categories in total exports is the evolution, for each of them, of the market share of the different countries in the European economic area. Table 5 presents these results. Next we categorise EU imports in terms of the main determining factor, categorised as: natural resources, labour costs, scale economies, product differentiation and R&D. 7 Table 6 shows the weight of the sectors in each one of these categories in the total exports of each country.
sectors are excluded due to their heterogeneity. 6 Concerning the Portuguese situation, the Ministry of Economy (2002) presents a similar result. 7 This typology, and the next one to be considered, may be criticised on various grounds: firstly, that competitiveness depends on factors other than the main one considered and, secondly, that the factors describing a particular sector may differ across countries. Despite these limitations the typologies still appear to us to be useful. In 2000, among the countries considered, Portugal and Greece are those with the highest weight in the group of sectors in which labour costs are the key element, above the values of the CEEC and particularly those of the Czech Republic and Hungary. In sectors in which the main factor is product differentiation or R&D, on the other hand, the CEEC have a higher weight than Portugal. In terms of evolution, the share of these sectors in CEE exports increased considerably whilst in Portugal it remained practically unchanged. Table 7 uses the same typology but now for the EU market share. The groups of sectors where product differentiation and R&D are the decisive determinants are those where demand in the European market grew fastest between 1995
and 2000. Table 7 shows that in both cases Portugal (and Greece) lost market share. In fact, other than in sectors in which scale economies are the key factor, the Portuguese position deteriorated in all categories. On the contrary, CEEC gained market share in all segments other than those in which natural resources are most important (and trade liberalisation, it must be remembered, is less advanced in these sectors). Starting from an unfavourable situation, the Czech Republic and Hungary had already attained, by 2000, a market share higher than the Portuguese one in sectors with more dynamic specialisation factors.
Let us now make the evaluation according to the technological level (high, medium and low), as reported in Table 8 . In 2000, low technology exports represented more than 50% of total Portuguese exports whilst in the case of the CEEC the value was 40.7%. In Hungary, the figure was as low as 21.8%. In the CEEC (and mainly in Hungary), during the time-period analysed, there was a strong increase in the weight of high technology sectors in total exports. In Portugal, the increase was marginal. Ireland is a special case with 55% of total exports coming from high technology sectors. The evaluation of market shares according to these criteria is shown in Table 9 . To complement the analysis, we evaluate changes in EU market share by considering those products where Portugal displays high levels of revealed comparative advantage (RCA), as measured by the Balassa export performance index for the EU market. 8 The sectors where Portugal has, in 2000, the highest RCA values (in decreasing order and considering only sectors with an RCA score greater than 5) are: knitwear, wood products, carpets, leather, consumer electronics and clothing. Other than consumer electronics, all are low-tech sectors in which production is based on low labour costs and, in the case of wood articles, on natural resources. In contrast, consumer electronics is a high technology sector in which R&D is important. In all six sectors, demand is either sluggish or declining.
The evolution of the market shares of these key-sectors for the Portuguese economy is presented in Table 10 . In all sectors presented in Table 10 , Portugal lost market share between 1995 and 2000 whilst the CEEC share expanded. In spite of this, in most cases the improvement in CEEC performance is relatively modest. The exception interestingly is consumer electronics, where both CEEC as a whole and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, individually, increased their market shares substantially.
It is possible that the price-quality structure of Portuguese exports in the EU market corresponds to different market segments as compared to the exports of the CEE countries. Caetano et al. (2002, Table 22 ) measure the percentages of high, medium and low quality exports in the total EU exports of Portugal and the CEE10 by using the 'trade flow unit value' approach of Freudenberg and Müller (1991) . For exports where the ratio A of the country's export unit value to the average EU import unit value is above 1.15, the quality is considered to be high; the quality is medium if 0.85 ≤ A ≤ 1.15, and is low if A< 0.85.
In 2000 only Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia had a higher share of high-quality exports than Portugal. The general picture is that medium quality exports predominate in Portugal (45.5 % of the total in 2000) whilst in the CEE countries (other than Bulgaria) the low quality range predominates. Thus, it may be the case that even in sectors in which Portugal is losing market share it is competing successfully with the CEEC in terms of quality. However this advantage could be eroded since all CEE countries other than Latvia and Slovenia improved the price-quality of their exports between 1993 and 2000 while the share of each category in total Portuguese exports remained fairly stable.
The market-share analysis has shown that the growing penetration of CEE exports in the EU market has occurred mainly in medium and high technology sectors in which demand is dynamic and whose competitiveness depends largely on product differentiation and R&D. These are precisely the sectors in which Portugal fared worst in terms of EU market share. The role of FDI is relevant in explaining this evolution, in that FDI is largely responsible for the transformation of the comparative advantage of CEE countries. Multinational firms attracted to CEE countries began to export to the EU.
Export-oriented FDI, furthermore, is more important in dynamic high value-added sectors, and has thus contributed to the increasing specialisation of the CEEC in these sectors.
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It is very likely that the trade adjustment process is not yet complete, particularly in labour-intensive sectors where liberalisation was slower. For Portugal this may mean a further diminution in the traditional sectors. On the other hand however, it is also likely that the CEEC position in the more dynamic modern sectors will improve further. This may make it more difficult for Portugal to replace its traditional sectors by more dynamic ones, as illustrated in Table 1 . These difficulties will be accentuated if FDI is displaced, which is the topic to which we now turn.
Inward FDI -Competition between Portugal and CEEC?
Inward FDI can be of considerable importance for peripheral countries seeking to converge on the more developed EU core. FDI impacts on a range of important areas: capital formation, employment creation, tax revenue generation and trade. FDI also has a number of indirect effects, involving the accumulation of technology, knowledge, skills and other resources representing the intangible assets of multinational firms (Blömstrom et al., 2000) . The competitive pressures it introduces can also act as a stimulus to greater efficiency on the part of domestic firms. FDI is therefore likely to increase productivity 9 It is nevertheless important to note the limitations of RCA analyses in this regard, as they present a static picture of a process that is in dynamic mutation; Barry and Hannan (2003b) . and promote economic growth. This effect was confirmed for the Portuguese economy by Flôres et al. (2002) and Proença et al. (2002) .
There has been a spectacular increase in CEE-bound FDI over the last decade, as shown in Table 11 . But there are several reasons to assume that this trend will receive a further stimulus after adhesion. Firstly, the fact that efforts to remove any remaining nontariff barriers are likely to be pursued more vigorously in the case of intra-EU trade.
Secondly, accession will increase the confidence of foreign investors by allowing the possibility of appeal beyond the courts of the associated countries to those of the European Union in the event of legal disputes arising. Thirdly, EU membership serves as some guarantee of transparency in the legal and business environment because of the acquis communautaire and the culture of checking the probity of Structural Funds expenditures and fourthly, entry to the Single Market will fully remove customs frontiers and trade barriers associated with different technical standards, and will allow full access to government procurement contracts throughout the EU. For all these reasons accession is likely to represent as dramatic a change in the CEE climate for foreign investors as it did for Ireland, Spain and Portugal upon their respective accessions to the EU (Barry, 2003) . (2001) In the case of Portugal, FDI inflows increased significantly after EU accession, reaching a peak of nearly 5% of GDP in 1991. Between 1991 and 1994 there was a decrease, but after that period of time the increase in FDI inflows was resumed.
From 1996 onwards however, significant divestment flows have been registered, with an increasing tendency at least until 2000. 10 In 1999, foreign direct investment net of divestment was only 1% of GDP and was actually negative in terms of firms' equity. to 10 (representing the best), with some exceptions. Our purpose is mainly to evaluate the relative position for each indicator for Portugal, the other EU Cohesion countries and the most relevant CEE countries (Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland). Table 12 presents a first group of competitiveness indicators concerning government efficiency. As one could expect, Ireland is by far the country best positioned across most criteria. Several weaknesses are evident in the Portuguese position relative to the CEEC. First, the justice system, a key element for the regular functioning of a market economy and for generation trust among investors, appears to be deficient. Other weaknesses appear at the level of government action: an uncompetitive fiscal system, a weak response to entrepreneurial needs and excessive bureaucracy are patent in Table 12 .
Another relevant aspect is the excessive rigidity of labour markets. 12 In what concerns the existence of venture capital and the functioning of banking services, the Portuguese situation is reasonable. Concerning the CEEC, two aspects should be pointed out: first, the strong position in particular of Hungary and the Czech Republic in the generality of the criteria considered, and second, their strong position with respect to criterion 11, reflecting the enormous effort made by these countries to attract FDI.
13 Table 13 displays information concerning infrastructure.
12 New labour legislation to allow greater flexibility is to be implemented in Portugal. 13 Leite et al. (2001) also use this indicator but they take into consideration the average of the last 6 years. In their analysis, which includes the same countries as we do, the Czech Republic scores lowest, while Portugal is surpassed only by Ireland. The comparison with the present study reveals the rapid progress made by the CEEC in recent years. In this case, in contrast to the indicators related to government efficiency, the Portuguese position is not dramatically different from that of the CEEC (once again with Hungary and the Czech Republic at the top position) or the other Cohesion countries. In fact, despite specific differences, we do not detect, in this group of indicators, a clear obstacle to the attraction of FDI in any of the countries considered.
The quality of human capital is generally agreed to be one of the major weaknesses of the Portuguese economy and so it deserves a more detailed study. Table   14 supplies information on this. Portugal has the lowest productivity levels in the EU15. This global picture in terms of human capital, together with a specialisation in sectors of low added value, labour intensity, facing declining demand and with a weak technological component (as emphasised in section 2), are decisive factors in explaining this.
The degree of centrality (or "closeness to purchasing power") also affects FDI in certain particular sectors.
14 Schürmann and Talaat (2000) As against this, however, it is important to note that each previous tradeliberalisation episode within Europe increased the pool of FDI both from within Europe and from outside (Dunning, 1997a, b) . The goods produced by multinational firms also tend to have relatively high income elasticities of demand so that the expected growth in the CEEC10 consequent on enlargement should generate further flows of FDI into and within the newly expanded EU (Barry and Hannan, 2003a) . A further relevant detail is that the Single Market liberalisation was associated with an expansion in the average number of plants that the leading multinational firms in the EU maintained. Among such firms with plants in Portugal for example, the average number of EU countries (other than their home bases) in which they maintained plants rose from 4.4 in 1987 to 5 in 1993, while the share of their European foreign production that they located in Portugal increased by 8 percent (Pavelin and Barry, 2003) . This suggests that the development of the Single Market was associated with a further fragmentation of the production chain. If this proves to be the case it will be efficiency-enhancing and should operate to the further benefit of Portugal's foreign-owned industry.
The notion that enlargement will considerably enhance the attractiveness of the CEE countries as a location for export-oriented foreign direct investment, and as such will allow them to compete more strongly and successfully for such investment, will also stimulate Portuguese firms to invest in these countries. While Portugal has recently become a net investor abroad and Portuguese investment in CEE markets is increasing, it remains slight, with a weight of no more than 1 % of total Portuguese direct investment abroad. Poland is the main destination for these firms, with 98% of the total in the 1996-99 period. 
Migration Issues
The possibility of substantial migration flows from CEE countries to the EU15 is a widely discussed issue because of the very large income gap that exists, as well as the geographical proximity of the accession countries. This has led EU incumbents to favour only a gradual opening up of labour markets, in the knowledge that ongoing convergence in living standards will make substantial migration less likely.
So far, migration flows from CEEC have been very modest, which is not surprising given the rigid immigration legislation in EU countries. At the end of the 1990's, the stock of foreign residents who have immigrated from the CEEC-10 to the EU is estimated at some 870,000 individuals, accounting for around 0.5 % of the total CEE population, 0.2 % of the total EU population and 0.3 % of the total EU workforce. The consensus is that, even with full liberalisation, such flows will not increase dramatically.
The main reason is that economic convergence is likely over the medium term, while migration is hindered by high transaction costs and the limited absorption capacity of labour markets in the destination countries.
The experience of the previous southern enlargement of Greece, Portugal and Spain is usually taken as a benchmark. These acceding countries also displayed substantial differences in terms of incomes and wages (though more attenuated) and geographical proximity to EU incumbent countries, but the results were very modest.
Some of these traditional EU emigration countries have even turned into immigration countries. According to Brücker (2001) , the stock of foreign residents from the Southern EU members had already reached equilibrium levels when free movement was allowed (between 6 and 7 years after accession).
Estimates of likely migration patterns take into account income differences, distances and traditional ties between sending and receiving economies, the labourmarket characteristics and demographics of the various countries and expectations of future economic evolutions. Boeri and Brücker (2000) incorporate these various determinants, and, based on an assumed convergence of 2 percent per annum between CEEC and EU income levels and no significant change in unemployment rates, conclude that after full liberalisation a maximum of 350,000 immigrants will move in the first year with this figure declining to less than 150,000 a decade after. In the long term (2030) the population of CEEC living in the EU is expected to increase from the current 0.2% level to 1.1 %.
These potential flows, furthermore, will be concentrated in particular on Germany and Austria, which are at the end location for over 80 percent of CEE migrants at present.
Traditionally, Portugal has been characterised by emigration rather than immigration, and substantial immigration is not envisaged in most studies on enlargement. Boeri and Brücker (2000) predict the stock of CEE residents in Portugal to rise from a figure of 780 that they quote for 1998 to a total of 3,560 by 2030. However, recently, there has been a significant inflow of migrants, including from Eastern countries, to occupy less skilled jobs in the construction sector (which registered a boom in the 1990's, in part supported by European Funds), and also in sectors such as restaurants and domestic services.
Portugal has also adopted what appeared to be a more permissive immigration legislation than a number of other EU countries. In 1992-93 and again in 1996, illegal immigrants were allowed to apply for a "residence permit". The result was the legalisation of around 70,000 individuals, and the prospect of a "friendly" policy towards Most of these Eastern immigrants in Portugal come from Ukraine, followed at some distance by Moldovans, Romanians and Russians. Ukrainians already represent the third largest foreign community in Portugal, with over 40,000 "temporary stay permits" granted during the legalisation undertaken in 2001, i.e., 35.4 % of the total (Peixoto, 2002) . Entrance and stay of many of these immigrants is linked to trafficking networks, which contributes to speed up the process of migration.
Will Eastern immigration into Portugal increase substantially in the future? It may do, primarily because of low unemployment relatively to the EU average while the female participation rate is higher than the EU average (at 63% compared to 59% in 1999). However, there are a range of factors that make Portugal a less desirable location from the viewpoint of potential immigrants. Per capita income and wage levels are low, the geographical position is not favourable and there are no significant cultural affinities or historical linkages. Besides, the unemployment rate is rapidly increasing (from 3.9%
in the second quarter of 2001 to 5.1% in the third quarter of 2002). As unemployment primarily affects unskilled workers, this will make the job market less attractive.
Another relevant issue concerns the impact of immigration. The effect on the labour market and on per capita income will depend primarily on immigrant skill levels relative to the indigenous population. If skill levels are equivalent, then with international capital mobility the effects are minimal. If immigrants are less skilled, the distribution of income becomes less equitable as downward pressure is exerted on the unskilled wage.
Unemployment may also rise, as it tends to be concentrated among the less skilled. The net fiscal costs of immigration will also be larger as unskilled immigrants use more government services and pay less tax. All these effects will be reversed of course if immigrants are more highly skilled than the indigenous population. But the situation in Portugal, as in the rest of the EU, is that most immigrants of Eastern European origin are in occupations which do not fully reflect their skills.
Requests during 2001 on "temporary stay permits" show the following distribution by sector of the Eastern European population: 43.6 % in construction, 21.3 % in manufacturing, 15.4 % in services, 6.7 % in trade, 6.5 % in agriculture, fishing and extractive industries and 6.3 % in hotels and restaurants (Pires, 2002) .
A possible indirect impact of future free labour will be a crowding-out of Portuguese emigrants by migrants from the East. Such an effect would increase further the pressures on the Portuguese unskilled labour market. Almost 10 per cent of the Portuguese population are resident in other EU countries, predominantly in France and, to a lesser extent, in Germany. These two countries received between 1955 and 1996, respectively, over 1047,000 and 344,000 Portuguese emigrants (Peixoto, 1999) . Outflows to France decreased in the period 1975-96 (to 16% of the total registered in the period 1955-74), but emigration to Germany diminished only slightly between these two subperiods. Even if such a crowding-out effect were not to occur in an expressive way, Eastern migration may always discourage further outflows from Portugal into present EU members.
Economic and Social Cohesion Policy
The coming enlargement will entail a substantial increase in demands upon the EU budget, notably in the cases of the CAP and the Structural Funds. It has been agreed however that the ceiling on the EU budget will remain at 1.27% of GDP.
Analyses The cost to Portugal would escalate however if costs and benefits were to be redistributed within the EU in line with current income levels. It is well known that Germany bears a disproportionate share of the current burden while countries like France, Ireland and Greece, and to a far lesser extent Portugal, contribute less than the figures warranted by their current income levels. 18 Over time it has to be envisaged that a more equitable sharing of the burden will be negotiated among EU member states. de la How important have those funds been for the Portuguese economy? Table 15 summarises the impact of Structural Funds in terms of additional growth of GDP.
18 Spain is found to contribute around one and a half billion euro per annum more than is warranted according to these calculations (de la Fuente and Doménech, 2001) . 19 The exclusion of Madeira from Objective 1 is probably related to its high weight of off-shore financial activities and does not reflect the structural reality of the region. Nevertheless, owing to the ultra-peripheral region statute there is the possibility of its retaining its Objective 1 status (Ministry of Economy, 2002) . 20 This will not be the case for Spain (Martín et al. , 2002) . However, it remains a long way from the EU average; the European Commission's Second Cohesion Report predicts that it will be at least 20-30 years before this can be attained. Furthermore, the expected convergence between Portuguese NUTS II regions did not occur, as divergence increased slightly in recent years (Porto, 2002) .
The 75% per capita GDP threshold for Objective 1 eligibility may be revised upwards to ensure that regions currently eligible for assistance and whose need will continue beyond 2006 are not rendered ineligible. The crucial point however is how the additional effort required of an effective regional funding policy in the context of the enlarged Union is to be financed. One solution would be to increase the limit of the "own resources"; this limit was fixed at the Edinburgh Summit in 1992 and has not been changed since then. However, the net contributory countries will hardly accept this solution. The other -more realistic -solution, is related to the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP expenditure is by far the largest item in the Community's global budget -accounting for around 40% of EU expenditures -and exceeds regional development funding to a significant degree.
CAP reform is required not only because it is one of the main policies of the EU in budgetary terms, but also because of the size of the agriculture sector in many acceding countries. With enlargement the CAP becomes even more unsustainable, increasing the imperative to shift its focus away from funding production towards the funding of rural development. This would increase the resources available for regional development as other monies are freed up.
Portugal is one of the countries that benefits least from the CAP, receiving only 1.6 % of total transfers. In fact, it is the only cohesion country that is a net contributor to CAP. The transfer of part of current CAP expenditures into regional funding -entailing abandoning the current limit of 0.46% of EU GDP for Structural Actions -would help maintain the level of structural support that Portugal receives at present.
Conclusion
Enlargement will have important implications for Portugal. To some extent these are already noticeable in the wake of the Europe Agreements. Portuguese exports bear a strong similarity to those from Central and Eastern Europe, and have been losing EU market share as the CEE economies expand. To this extent Portugal can be said to be "being squeezed from below" in that its traditional export sectors are under threat. At the same time, its specialisation has been increasingly confined to low-technology, lowadded-value sectors with declining demand, as strong FDI inflows to the CEEC has led to an increasing preponderance of more dynamic sectors in their export structures. Thus it is also "being squeezed from above". This suggests that there may be substantial industrial disruption, in response to which labour-market flexibility and dynamic entrepreneurial response is crucial. A worrying aspect of this is that intersectoral mobility is generally easier the more highly educated the workforce -an indicator on which Portugal scores quite poorly.
For this reason, amongst others, many of the CEE countries are in a more favourable position than Portugal with respect to future FDI inflows. Several have followed Ireland's lead in offering low rates of corporation taxes, the more advanced ones have more highly skilled populations, and labour costs are generally lower than in Portugal. Upon accession, they will have equally easy access to the high-income markets integrated with the country's FDI-oriented industrialisation strategy -appears to help explain its convergence.
of Western Europe and, if they learn their lessons correctly, are likely to enjoy stable macro policy environments and regulatory and public administration systems equivalent to those elsewhere in the EU. This opens up the possibility that they might compete directly with Portugal, Spain and Ireland for FDI, as argued by Barry (2003) . There is indeed some evidence that this is already occurring in the case of Southern Europe.
Portugal may be particularly adversely affected given the relatively low human-capital stock and deficiencies in the efficiency of the government sector.
While the former, in terms of education and training, can only be tackled as part of a long-term development strategy, public-sector deficiencies and flaws in the conduct of macroeconomic policy can be tackled more easily -if the political will to do so is present.
Enlargement will also open up the possibility of more substantial labour migration. Most studies estimate that inflows will be quite modest, with the majority of migrants going to Germany and Austria. Portugal will receive only a very limited fraction of these flows. The impact on wages and living standards will depend on the skills of the migrants but if inflows are as modest as most studies suggest, these effects will be fairly negligible. We have pointed out the possibility however that Portuguese emigrants may Portugal indeed may well stand to lose most from enlargement, as Baldwin et al. (1997) and Breuss (2001) suggest. Nevertheless, the capacity to respond to this is endogenous. One recalls historian Arnold Toynbee's theory of "challenge and response", developed in his Study of History. All cultures and societies face various challenges. It is their capacity to respond to these challenges that determines their success or failure.
